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Abstract 
Much  interest  has  been  given  to  the  involvement  of  civil  society  in  EU  policy-making, 
especially over the last decade, as a mean to counter the so called „crisis of politics‟. This 
paper examines the role of environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO) in the 
policy process leading to the adoption of the amending emissions trading system directive 
(ETS-directive), adopted in December 2008 in trialogue and formally in April 2009 by the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
The aim of this study has been to assess the influence of the ENGOs in the particular case of 
the  ETS-directive.  It  examines  enabling  and  constraining  factors,  more  specifically  the 
channels  used  by  the  ENGOs  in  achieving  their  aims  as  well  as  the  significance  of 
representativeness for ENGOs in EU interest representation. The topic of this paper fits into 
the wider question of whether external actors actually have a real impact on the final policy 
outcome in the EU policymaking or if the involvement of civil society remains a procedural 
issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
   1 
Introduction 
The science is clear. Climate change is happening. The impact is real. The 
time to act is now.[…][U]nless we act, there will be serious consequences: 
rising  sea  levels;  more  frequent  and  less  predictable  floods  and  severe 
drought; famine around the world, particularly in Africa and Central Asia; 
and the loss of up to a third of our plant and animal species.
1 
 
Those  were  the  words  of  Ban  Ki-moon  during  the  United  Nations  climate 
conference in Bali in 2007. Since then, the EU has adopted the so called „climate 
action and renewable energy package‟ (the Climate Package), which is made up of six 
directives.
2 In this paper, the focus will be on one of these directives, the amending 
Directive to improve and extend the greenhouse gas  (GHG)  emission allowance 
trading system (ETS-directive), which is the core directive of the Climate Package. 
The EU is a sui generis political system; it is not like any other political system 
we are used to studying. The power is fragmented between many different actors, and 
this is often described as an obstacle to democracy.
3 Since the 1990s a discourse on the 
increased involvement of civil society in the EU policy process has been present. In 
2001 the Commission published its White Paper on governance, which reinforced the 
culture of consultation and dialogue. The idea was that increased consultation of 
interest groups throughout the policy process will improve the democratic process and 
take  citizens  closer  to  the  EU  and  in  that  way  dealing  with  the  EU‟s  so  called 
                                                 
1 Full text of a speech by the UN secretary general, Ban-Ki moon, to ministers and heads of state at the 
United Nations climate change conference in Bali, Guardian.co.uk, 12 December 2007.  
2 Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
system, Shared effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Geological storage of carbon dioxide, 
Monitoring and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from fuels (road transport and inland waterway 
vessels, Emission performance standards for new passenger cars. 
3 Justin Greenwood, “Advocacy, Influence and Persuasion: Has it All Been Overdone?” in Jenny 
Fairbrass and Alex Warleigh, eds. Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of 
Persuasion and Advocacy, Cornwall: Europa Publications Limited, 2002, pp. 24-25.   2 
democratic deficit.
4 Interest consultation has in many ways become equal with „good 
governance‟.
5 
This paper will focus on the role of environmental interest groups in the policy 
process that led to the adoption of the ETS-directive. It will examine the impact the 
Environmental Non Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) had on the policy process, 
what  channels  they  used  to  influence,  in  what  manner  they  interacted  with  the 
European  institutions
6, enabling and constraining factors for the ENGOs  ability  to 
influence and whether any stakeholder had a disproportional impact related to its size 
(representativeness).  
As regards the wider issue of whether interest groups have any real chance to 
influence in the EU policy process, the results of this study are largely in line with the 
conclusions drawn by other researchers in this field.
7 However, one interesting finding 
in this study is that, in contrast to what could be expected, the size of an ENGO does 
not necessarily determine the impact of its advocacy work. 
 
1. Theoretical Model and Methodological Framework 
A player exercises political influence if  his presence, thoughts or actions 
cause a political decision-maker to meet his interests or objectives more than 
would have been the case had this player been absent.
8 
 
There is no objective way of measuring influence, and however precise and 
strict  the  researcher  is  with  his  or  her  methods,  the  results  will  remain  informed 
                                                 
4 Emanuela Bozzini, “The role of civil society organisations in written consultation processes: from the 
European Monitoring Centre to the European Fundamental Rights Agency” in Vincent Della Sala and 
Carlo Ruzza, eds. Governance and Civil Society in EU, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2007, 
p. 94f  
5 Hélène Michel, “Incantations and uses of civil society by the European Commission” in Bruno Jobert 
and Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.) Changing Images of Civil Society – From protest to governance, London, 
Routledge, 2008. 
6 Focus will be on the European Commission (the Commission), the European Parliament (the EP), the 
Council of Ministers (the Council) and to some extent the European Council. 
7 Cf. Greenwood, Zito, Peterson and Bomberg. 
8 Bas Arts, The Political Influence of Global NGOs – Case Studies on The Climate and Biodiversity 
Conventions, Utrecht, International Books, 1998 p. 58   3 
guesses.
9 In this study Hubert‟s model was applied in order to assess the influence of 
the ENGOs. This model has been useful as it introduces clear rules and premises for 
the assessment of political influence in a single decision-making process. According to 
Hubert, the likelihood that actor A has influenced actor B increases if: 
1. A really intended to change B; 
2. A had access to B; 
3. the time lag between A‟s attempt and B‟s change is short; 
4. B‟s policy change is in A‟s interest (goal-achievement).
10  
 
Accordingly,  the  indicators  intention,  policy  change,  time-lag  and  goal-
achievement  are  essential  in  this  method.
11  In  this  study,  Hubert‟s  model  was 
complemented  by  the  EAC-method,  which  stands  for  Ego-perception,  Alter-
perception and Causal analysis.
12 As a first step, a number of ENGOs involved in the 
policy process leading to the adoption of the ETS-directive were selected through the 
participation list of the Commissions stakeholder consultation process , as well as the 
actors listed in the report of the  European Parliament (EP) rapporteur. These actors
13 
were asked to assess their own influence on the outcome (ego -perception). As a 
second step, officials involved in the decision-making process in the Commission, the 
Council  and  the  EP  were  asked  to  assess  the  influence  of  the  ENGOs  (alter -
perception). Finally, these assessments were subject to a causal analysis.  
The figure below
14 represents the assumed causal effects and how the different 
factors are linked to each other. The aim of using this  figure is to give the reader a 
clear structure, as well as explanatory and contextual insights and an overview of the 
assumptions made by the author. The remaining part on this paper will mostly follow 
this structure. 
                                                 
9 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in American City. New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1961, p.330 
10Arts, op. cit. p.78 
11 Ibid. p.78 
12 Ibid. p. 80 
13 CAN Europe, WWF, Greenpeace, Bellona, E3G 
14 Adapted version of Arts, op. cit.,  p.71   4 
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2. The Emissions Trading System: Context 
This section will present enabling and constraining factors that contributed to 
put  climate  change  on  the  agenda  in  2006  and  2007  and  that  later  led  to  the 
Commissions proposed Climate Package in January 2008 and the adoption of it in 
December 2008.
15  
The Emissions Trading System (ETS) is a cap and trade system that sets a cap 
on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowing the polluters to trade emissions permits 
in order to make sure abatement is made where it is most cost effective. The main 
problem in the first phase of the ETS was an over-allocation of permits, which resulted 
in a low market value of the emissions permits. The system also suffered from a low 
degree of harmonisation among the member states in allocating the allowances. The 
amending Directive was aimed at tackling both these deficits.
16  
The legal basis for the ETS-directive was Article 175 in the EC Treaty, and the 
procedure  to  be  used  was  as  laid  down  in  article  251,  namely  the  co -decision 
procedure.
17  According to this procedure the Council and the EP have an equal 
decision-making power, and the decision in the Council is taken by qualified majority 
voting (QMV) where the various Member States hold a number of votes relative to the 
size of their population. 
One factor contributing to the political importance of climate change was 
scientific  research  and  its  impact  on  public  opinion.  T he  Stern  Review  on  the 
Economics of Climate Change soon became the most widely known and discussed 
report about the impact of climate change on the world economy.
18 The documentary 
                                                 
15 Some of these factors were presented by Josephine Wood in a lecture at the College of Europe, 17
 
April 2009. 
16 Questions and Answers on the Commission‟s proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading System, 
MEMO/08/35, 2008.01.23 
17 Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice Treaty, consolidated version)  
18 „Time to get Stern on climate change‟, The First Post, 30 October 2006.   6 
film and the book, An Inconvenient Truth, by former US Vice President Al Gore was 
shown in cinemas and in schools and was viewed by politicians around the world
19. 
Finally, the fourth evaluation report from the International Panel on Climate Change 
stated that the global warming of the 20
th century was unambiguous, and that there is a 
strong correlation between the human emission of greenhouse gases and the measured 
increase in temperature during the last decades.
 20  
Another factor relates to politics. At the European Council meeting in March 
2007, the EU heads of state and government agreed to make a unilateral commitment 
to cut GHG emissions by 20 percent by 2020 and by 30 percent if an international 
agreement  were  reached,  the  starting  point  of  the  process  leading  to  the  Climate 
Package
21. At the G8 meeting in June 2007 further commitments were made by the 
large industrial countries
22. The issue of energy security had become an increasingly 
problematic issue, and its connection to climate change policy was also stipulated in 
the European Council‟s conclusions from December 2008: “The Union's efforts to 
combat climate change are coupled with resolute action to enhance its energy security, 
including  interconnections  and  the  connection  of  the  most  isolated  European 
countries”.
23 Finally the election of Barack Obama as US president in November 2008 
signalled an important change after eight years with his rather climate-change critical 
predecessor. Obama announced in his campaign that he would aim to reduce CO2 
emissions  by  80  percent  in  2050  compared  to  19 90  levels  and  to  renew  US 
leadership
24, which was mainly perceived by the EU as a positive sign of a changed 
attitude in the US but also as a threat to the EU‟s leadership role.
25 
                                                 
19 „Inconvenient Truth‟ To Continue Arising in Schools‟, Spiegel Online International, 13 October 
2007. 
20 Climate Change Report 2007: Synthesis Report 
21 „EU energy summit: a new start for Europe?‟, EurActiv, 13 March 2007 
22 „G8 Leaders agree to a deal‟, BBC News, 7 June 2007 
23 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 11-12 December 2008 
24 John M. Broder, „Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals‟, NY Times, 18 November 2008. 
25 Interview with a representative from PES in the European Parliament, 21 April 2009.   7 
As factors relating to economy should be mentioned, the financial crisis that 
started to become increasingly evident in the autumn of 2008, and this to some extent 
turned the game on the Climate Package to the advantage of the business interests. 
Previously ignored attempts  from  business  interest  to  influence the MEPs all of a 
sudden “appeared to attune the politicians‟ ears.”
26 However, the financial crisis can 
also  be  evoked  as  a  factor  that  may  have  pushed  some  of  the  actors  to  reach  an 
agreement faster than otherwise would have been the case, since they realised that it 
would  be  even  harder  to  agree  on  an  ambitious  package  when  the  crisis  had 
worsened.
27 According to a representative of the aluminium industry, the industry did 
indeed manage to use the financial crisis as an argument to push the demands on 
emissions reductions down, but as an agreement was reached fast, they did not manage 
to exploit this argument as much as they could have if the process would have lasted 
longer.
28  
Finally, as regards the time factor, the Commission presented its package of 
proposals in January 2008 as a response to the targets set by the heads of state and 
government  during  the  European  Council  summit  in  March  2007.
29  The  whole 
package was subject to the co-decision procedure, and the three institutions had agreed 
to aim for a first-reading agreement due to the urgency of the issue. The ultimate goal 
of the EU was to be  able to show strong leadership by having adopted far -reaching 
legal obligations for the post-2012 UN meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. As 
there were going to be EP elections in June 2009 , the institutions were anxious to 
reach an agreement before that, as a decision after the new EP was in place would 
have delayed the whole process considerably. The French presidency has also been 
                                                 
26 Joshua Chaffin, ‟Financial crisis a turning point for lobbyists‟ fortunes‟, Financial Times, 13 March 
2009. 
27 Interview with a representative from PES in the European Parliament, 21 April 2009. 
28 Interview with a representative from ALCOA, 27 April 2009. 
29 „Deal on EU Climate Package by year‟s end?‟, 3 July 2008, EurActiv.   8 
evoked  as  a  crucial  factor  since  French  presidencies  are  often  strong  and  well 
resourced, which was considered to be more or less necessary to push the package 
through.  The  Czech  presidency  that  followed  had  not  given  any  indication  of 
prioritising this issue.
30  
However, in October 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that 
the issue was going to be treated on the level of heads of state and government in the 
European Council in December 2008 and hence by unanimity instead of QMV.
31 
According to Sarkozy, this decision was made due to the sensitivity of the issue, as 
some Member States, notably Poland and Italy, had  threatened to block the decision 
due to the  downturn in the economy.
32 In that sense the EP and the Environmental 
Council were bypassed, and this caused some strong reactions, mainly from the EP.
33 
The fact that a decision was going to be taken by unanimity  in practice implied that a 
veto was given to all the Member States that wanted a less ambitious text. One of the 
interviewed representatives from an ENGO commented that Sarkozy seemed to want 
an agreement at any cost, and this was a very hard position for  the ENGOs to deal 
with: “The European Council largely side-lined the EP, the Commission, civil society 
and  the  citizens  when  they  did  their  deal.”
34  By  side-lining  the  EP,  the  European 
Council indirectly marginalised the role of the ENGOs. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Josephine Wood, lecture, 17 April 2009. 
31 „Brussels readies for tough climate negotiations‟, EurActiv, 17 October 2008. 
32 „The EU „holds firm‟ on climate goals‟, BBC, 16 October 2008.  
33 Interview with a representative from the French Permanent Representation, 23 April 2009. 
34 Interview with a representative of CAN Europe, 15 April 2009.   9 
3. The Political Arena 
One of the most conspicuous features of environmental decision-making is 
the influence of a  wide-array of  non-institutional  members and interests, 
particularly in the early 'shaping stages' (scientific experts, business interest 
groups and ENGOs).
35 
 
3.1 EU Institutions 
The Commission is often claimed to be the key institution to lobby. The ideal 
time  to  try  to  influence  the  Commission  is  prior  to  the  presentation  of  a  formal 
proposal. The Commission has several reasons to give external interests access,
36 since 
it lacks “resources, support, legitimacy, grass root contact, and [is] in search of allies 
to develop European integration.”
37 In general the Commission is prescribing to the 
principle of pluralism in its consultation. DG Environment is often described as one of 
the most open DGs for external interests to access, if not the most open DG.
38  
Once a proposal has been drafted, the lobbyist should turn its attention to the 
two  legislative  bodies,  namely  the  EP  and  the  Council.  The  EP  has  grown  in 
significance  gradually  with  the  successive  treaty  reforms,  especially  the  Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The EP now acts on an equal basis with the 
Council in the co-decision procedure, which is applicable to most of the previously so-
called first  pillar issues.
39  In fact, the EP holds a veto power in the co -decision 
procedure that makes it ver y important for external interest groups. Michalowitz 
argues that “[f]ailure to influence decisions at the Commission level could be rectified 
                                                 
35 Peterson and Bomberg, op.cit., p. 192. 
36 Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 
227. 
37 Greenwood, op cit., p. 27. 
38 Peterson and Bomberg, op.cit., p. 195. 
39 David Ernshaw, Josephine Wood, and Alex Warleigh, „The European Parliament as Entrepreneur: 
New Trends, New Challenges‟ in Jenny Fairbrass and Alex Warleigh, eds. Influence and Interests in the 
European. Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy, London, Europa Publications Limited 
2002, p. 75.   10 
at the Parliament level.”
40 The consultation in the EP is relatively open due to the 
directly elected, full-time and active MEPs. This culture of openness has also spread to 
the other institutions. Just like the Commission, the EP lacks resources, which makes it 
more open to contacts with interest groups that can sometimes come with direct input 
via amendments that the MEPs can simply take on.
41 Several of the representatives 
interviewed for the purpose of this study from the EP mentioned the input from the 
NGOs as something they considered very valuable.  
The Council is generally considered as the least open institutio n for non-
governmental interests to access. This is connected to the nature of the Council as an 
institution characterised by the interdependency  between the Member States  that 
conduct  political  horse -trading.  The  officials  in  the  preparatory  working  group s 
operate  on a national mandate ,  and the ministers are as a rule not accessible to 
lobbyists. If external interest groups want to give some input , they are more likely to 
contact national officials through national lobbying.
42   
The interviewed representatives from the ENGOs confirmed this, as they 
described their access to the Council considerably more constrained than their access 
to the other institutions. It is possible that business interests might have easier access 
to the Council, as they generally have more leverage due to the effects their decisions 
can have on the national economies, etc. 
3.2 ENGOs 
“You‟ve got to have access, you‟ve got to be relevant and you have 
to be close to the politics.”
43 
 
                                                 
40 Michalowitz,  op.cit., p. 47. 
41 Zito,  op.cit., p. 85. 
42 Michalowitz, op.cit., p. 48. 
43 Ibid.   11 
In  Brussels  the  ENGOs  worked  partly  through  public  campaigns,  outsider 
strategy, and partly through traditional lobbying, insider strategy. 
44 This section looks 
at each in turn. 
A  big  joint -campaign  on  the  Climate  Package  between  Climate  Action 
Network Europe (CAN Europe), Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and WWF was 
coordinated by CAN Europe. They set up a website ( www.timetolead.eu) where they 
tracked the policy process and showed what the current state of play meant in terms of 
rises in average levels of temperature. This was a way to communicate what the EU 
policy would imply concretely on an issue that is very complex and hard to grasp for 
the general public. They also encouraged citizens to send emails and lette rs to MEPs 
in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), and at a 
later stage to ministers and heads of state and government, as a way to communicate 
their message. Films were produced ,  and they set up loudspeakers outside the  EP 
before the vote in the ENVI Committee in October, with messages from citizens who 
wanted their MEPs to vote for ambitious targets. They also placed enormous ice 
blocks outside the Council building before a meeting in the Environmental Council 
when the policy process begun to come to an end , and they projected a film on the 
Commission‟s main building, the Berlaymont, opposite the Council building, where 
they showed rising sea levels.
45  
Parallel to this, the ENGOs engaged in traditional lobbying. They organised 
meetings with decision-makers, drafted amendments for „friendly‟ MEPs, worked to 
build support for MEPs, made voting recommendation papers and distributed them.
46  
                                                 
44 cf. Wyn Grant, „Pressure Politics: The Changing World of Pressure Groups‟,  Parliamentary Affairs, 
2004, Vol.. 57 No. 2, p. 408f 
45 Interviews with representatives from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009, WWF, 6 March 2009 and the 
Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU, 28 April 2009,  
46 Interviews with representatives from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009 and PES, European Parliament, 21 
April 2009.   12 
In  its  function  as  an  umbrella  organisation,  CAN  Europe
47  worked hard to find 
common positions between the ENGOs. On some issues the ENGOs did not manage 
to  find common  positions.  A represen tative  at  CAN  Europe  argued,  “The  more 
significant an issue is, the more there is a tendency for ENGOs to split away and do 
their own thing. Because it becomes important for an ENGO to be seen and not do 
things wrong, there is pressure on individual organisations to make sure that they are 
vocal.”
48  
CAN Europe tried to find common positions and to communicate them in press 
releases  and  to  decision-makers.  The  interviewee  from  CAN  Europe  stressed  the 
advantage of being united: “We have got all the logos on all material because it is 
much  stronger  speaking  with  one  voice.  If  everybody  says  the  same  thing  and 
hammers it, then that has more effect. We are considered as a block anyway, so if you 
are a MEP you prefer to have a meeting with „the NGOs‟ than a meeting with five 
different  organisations.  They  want  to  know  „the  NGO  position.‟”
49  In  general, 
lobbyists who “pool their resources” and cooperate “by sharing information and the 
„ear time‟ of a Commission official or an MEP” are the most successful ones.
50  
A major difference between NGOs and industry is that industry typically has 
one or two issues in a legal proposal that they are concerned about and towards which 
they  direct  all  of  their  resources,  whereas  NGOs  generally  care  about  the  whole 
proposal: everything is important to them.
51 Much of the difficulty for the ENGOs lies 
in finding the balance between pushing hard for an ambitious climate policy and at the 
same time remaining  relevant for the political actors. As one of the interviewees 
                                                 
47 WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth are all members of CAN Europe but Bellona is not. 
48 Interview with a representative from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Peterson, Bomberg, op.cit., p. 194. 
51 Interview with a representative from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009.   13 
expressed it, “You‟ve got to work out where the middle line is, and you have to push 
your arguments a bit further.”
52 
 
 
4. The EAC-Method Applied 
 
In this section the EAC-method presented in the theoretical part will be applied. To 
begin with, the aims of the ENGOs as set up in their advocacy documents will be 
briefly  presented  and  an  assessment  will  be  made  of  their  impact  based  on  a 
comparison with the EP report and the final Directive (casual analysis). Subsequently, 
the ENGOs‟ assessment of their own influence (ego-perception) will be presented and 
finally the EU-institutions assessment of the ENGOs‟ influence (alter-perception) will 
be presented. 
In short, the overall goal for the three main ENGOs (CAN Europe, WWF and 
Greenpeace) was to achieve emissions reductions that were consistent with the target 
of keeping climate change below +2 degrees Celsius. They based their analysis on 
IPCC  data,  and  the  calculations  were  made  on  the  assumption  that  all  Annex  I
53 
countries were making efforts comparable to those of the EU. They argued that the 
ETS-directive should be the main instrument to reduce GHG in a cost -effective way 
and called for: 
-  The level of the cap [to] be set in line with the EU meeting 
at  least  30  percent  cut  in  GHG  emissions  by  2020.  Any  use  of 
external credits [to] be set in addition to, not instead of, domestic 
reductions; 
-  All permits [to] be allocated through auctioning to ensure a 
level playing field and reward the least polluting installations; 
                                                 
52 Interview with a representative from WWF, 6 March 2009. 
53 Annex I countries are the developed countries according to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), namely: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, USA, retrieved 22 May 2011, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php   14 
-  All  revenues  from  auctioning  [to]  be  used  to  combat 
climate change in the EU and in developing countries.
54 
 
The  causal  analysis  consists  of  “the  researcher‟s  assessment  of  the 
ENGO‟s claims on the basis of policy documents.”
55 This section is based on the 
results from a systematic comparison between: the priority amendments presented by 
CAN Europe, WWF and Greenpeace
56; the EP‟s report; and the final Directive. 
The results show that the ENGOs did not have very much influence after the 
Commission‟s proposal had been presented. In only two cases were their proposed 
amendments included in the EP report, and only one of their proposals ended up in the 
final  Directive.  However,  these  are  the  proposed  changes  to  the  Commission‟s 
proposal as it stood; it does not reveal anything about how much the ENGOs managed 
to influence the proposal before it was presented and how much the original proposal 
reflected the ENGOs wishes to start with. It should also be remembered that ENGOs 
were there to push for an ambitious Climate Package, and it is normal that they would 
try for more than they would realistically think they could achieve, to have a margin. 
How hard the different  ENGOs pushed vary, some ENGOs are more  radical  than 
others. One interviewee from a large ENGO expressed this as follows: “I view politics 
as a dance where all the actors have a step to fulfil.”
57 The credibility of an ENGO is 
likely to vary according to how hard they are pushing for far-reaching legislation and 
hence how credible their demands are considered to be by the decision-makers. 
The two other ENGOs included in this study, Bellona and E3G, did not stand 
behind  these  amendments;  instead  they  focused  on  one  mechanism,  namely  the 
financing of the Carbon Capture Storage (CCS), and in the end they were successful in 
getting this through in the final text. As such they managed to achieve something quite 
                                                 
54 NGO briefing on the review of the EU emissions trading system, retrieved 22 May 2011, 
http://www.oxfamsol.be/nl/IMG/pdf/EmisTradingSystem.pdf 
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56 They will be referred to as „the three ENGOs‟ in this section. 
57 Interview with a representative from WWF, 6 March 2009.   15 
remarkable  together  with  a  group  of  other  actors.  The  EAC  method  can  help  us 
understand their impact. 
Ego-perception refers to “[v]iews of NGO representatives with regard to their 
own political influence.”
58 According to the ENGOs themselves, the votes in the EP 
were a big success. But once those votes were done they shifted focus to the Council, 
where it was a lot harder for them to have an impact.
59  
In general, the ENGOs were fairly satisfied with the final result. As expressed 
by one of the interviewees: “I am quite happy with where we are, I can live with it but 
it‟s not great.”
60 When asked to assess their own influence on a scale between 1-10 (10 
being maximum) the ENGOs assessed their influence to be on average 5.83/10. 
The ENGOs gave three main reasons why they got a deal on the ETS that was 
somewhat acceptable to them: a reasonably good proposal from the Commission that 
“did as much as they thought that they could get away with”
61; a very progressive 
position in the EP with an impressive contribution from the rapporteur who held her 
group together even though she was under enormous pressure; and finally “a more 
united than ever ENGO position.”
62 The Climate Package involved an unparalleled 
workload for the ENGOs, and as the interviewee from WWF expressed, “During the 
last two months, very few people slept.”
63 
The alter-perception refers to the views of decision-makers
64 with regard to 
the political influence of the ENGOs. All the decision -making actors interviewed 
somewhat agreed that the result was more or less balanced. As expressed by the 
assistant to the shadow rapporteur, “The ENGOs got a lot of influence even though 
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59 Interview with a representative from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009. 
60 Interview with a representative from WWF, 20 March 2009. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Interview with a representative from CAN Europe, 15 April 2009. 
63 Interview with a representative from WWF, 20 March 2009. 
64 In this case, the Commission will also be considered as a decision maker (even though it does not 
have any legislative power) since it had an essential role in formulating of the proposal.   16 
they said publicly that they were disappointed. That is part of how they speak, they are 
never satisfied.”
65 On average the decision-making actors assessed the influence of the 
ENGOs  at  7.17/10.  As  could  be  expected,  the  ENGO‟s  own  perception  of  their 
influence  is  in  most  cases  lower  than  the  alter-perception.  There  is  a  notable 
difference, but it is not enormous. 
All in all, the proposal set up by the Commission remained intact and only 
some details were changed. Most importantly for the ENGOs, the cap on emissions 
remained  the  same,  which  was  the  most  important  aspect  for  the  environmental 
integrity of the ETS-directive.  
Following  the  parameters  of  Hubert‟s  model,  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
parameters  were,  to  a  reasonable  extent,  fulfilled.  The  ENGOs  certainly  had  the 
intention to influence the decision-makers, there was a policy-change, the time lag was 
short and the ENGOs attained some goal-achievement. This indicates that the ENGOs 
indeed were successful in exercising political influence on the ETS-directive. In the 
following chapter, the nature of this influence will be analysed. 
 
5. Discussion  
This section will focus on the last two research questions, namely the enabling and 
constraining  factors  for  the  ENGOs‟  ability  to  influence,  and  the  question  of 
representativeness vs. good ideas, which is highly interlinked to the issue of large vs. 
small ENGOs. 
5.1 Enabling and constraining factors 
Public  interests,  such  as  environmental  groups,  generally  have  allies  in  the 
EP.
66 This was confirmed in this case by the interviewed ENGOs: “Our power lies in 
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the EP. Outside the EP we are relatively weak.”
67 Hence, the fact that the co-decision 
procedure  was  supposed  to  be  used  in  the  case  of  the  ETS  Directive  could  be 
considered  as  a  key  enabling  factor  that  would  have  increased  their  chances  to 
influence, as this procedure gives the EP more decision-making power than any other 
decision-procedure.  
As the French Presidency later decided to  move the issue to  the European 
Council, the possibility for the ENGOs to have an impact decreased considerably. The 
access to heads of state and government is largely restricted or non-existent for the 
ENGOs.
68 Private interests may have better chances to be influential on this level , as 
they have better leverage in terms of threats of job -losses or threats to move their 
activities outside the EU.
69 The fact that the final agreement was to be reached in the 
European Council can hence be regarded as a constraining factor for the ENGOs. 
Another constraining factor, interlinked with this, was the financial crisis that 
became increasingly pertinent during the autumn of 2008. The financial crisis framed 
the discussion about the ETS, and it was used by industry to lobby against imposing 
extra costs on industry.   The steel workers went out on the streets to demonstrate 
against the ETS since they were afraid to lose their jobs. The ENGOs had tr ouble 
communicating their cause - to fight a change in the climate that is not yet visible in 
most parts of the world, when some people were told they might lose the job because 
of that particular legislation - an inherent problem tackling climate change.  
However, what can be regarded as constraining factors for the ENGOs‟ ability 
to influence may also in the end have worked in their interest. A second reading, as 
opposed  to  a  „first  reading  agreement‟,  would  probably  have  given  industry  more 
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chances to get their concerns listened to
70 and hence the end result might have been 
less in line with the aims of the ENGOs. A representative from the Party of European 
Socialists (PES) argued that the financial crisis made the actors who were in favour of 
an agreement push even harder, knowing that the economic situation was not going to 
make the chances of getting an ambitious package be tter.
71 Interlinked with this, the 
French  Presidency‟s  decision  to  move  the  final  decision  to  the  European  Council 
produced  an  agreement  that  otherwise  might  not  have  been  possible  in  the  first 
reading.  Both  these  factors  contributed  to  a  speedy  conclusion  that,  if  taking  the 
argument of the representative of the aluminium industry into account, gave fewer 
chances for industry to get their points across. Hence although it contributed to limit 
the  possibilities  for  ENGOs  to  have  a  direct  impact,  it  probably  worked  in  their 
interest to make the final text more ambitious than would otherwise have been the 
case. 
5.2 Small versus large ENGOs  
As mentioned above, Bellona and E3G formed part of a multi-stakeholder 
group that managed to get a new article added that was not part of the initial proposal, 
and that indirectly contributed to enlarging the EU‟s budget (the mechanism for the 
financing of CCS). Considering the relatively small size of these two ENGOs, it is 
quite remarkable that they managed to  achieve  this  result, even when taking into 
consideration their cooperation with other actors.
72 The technique that captures carbon 
dioxide has been quite controversial among environmentalists, and many of the large 
ENGOs were opposed to the use of it.
73 This was one of the areas in which CAN 
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Europe did not have a position, due to the fact that its members did not agree on this 
point.
74 As expressed by the interviewee from Bellona:  
It‟s not a thing that wins members, I think it was a sort of „good 
cop, bad cop situation‟ where the large NGOs kept shut about CCS 
financing and they respected our role as being an NGO to favour 
CCS financing and making sure that CCS financing does not end up 
as perverse subsidies for the utilities.
75  
 
Consequently, one can envisage that one of the reasons why Bellona and E3G 
were able to take such a strong position on such a controversial issue was due to the 
fact that they are less abundant on members. As a consequence they did not have as 
much to lose in terms of members while the big organisations, especially an umbrella 
organisation  like  CAN  Europe,  were  unwilling  or  unable  to  take  that  fight.  The 
hypothesis  that  „small‟  ENGO‟s  can  be  influential  despite  their  smallness  and 
umbrella organisations‟ tendency to be paralysed is therefore strengthened by this 
case.  
5. 3 Representativeness vs. ‘good ideas’ 
The question about the importance of representativeness for interest groups is 
dependent on what is aimed to be achieved by the inclusion of external interests in the 
policy process. If the aim is to create input legitimacy, then representativeness will be 
an important factor. If instead the aim is to achieving „good‟ legislation, i.e. output 
legitimacy, then it is likely that more attention will be directed to it if the interest 
groups  have  good  ideas  and  are  well  informed.  One  of  the  interviewees  at  the 
Commission emphasised that they listened to the stakeholders to see if they had a case. 
If there was a case, it had to be tested to see how serious it was.
76 In fact, most of the 
interviewees  from  the  institutions  seemed  to  agree  that  „good  ideas‟  were  more 
important than representativeness. On the other hand, they also said that it is harder to 
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ignore an organisation that represents a lot of members than it is to ignore one with 
few.  
Ruzza found that many institutions stress the importance of representativeness. 
For example, the Economic and Social Committee declared,  
A  basic  precondition  and  legitimising  basis  for  participation  is 
adequate  representativeness  of  those  speaking  for  organised  civil 
society  […]  when  consulting  civil  society  organisations,  the 
European Institutions should check how representative these bodies 
are.
77  
 
However,  the  Commission  also  recognises  that  good  ideas  and 
representativeness are not always the same thing, representativeness:  
…should not be the only determining factor for membership in an 
advisory  committee,  or  to  take  part  in  dialogue  with  the 
Commission. Other factors such as their track record and ability to 
contribute  substantial  policy  inputs  to  the  discussion  are  equally 
important.
78  
 
This implies, as Ruzza points out, that “considerations of output legitimacy can 
conflict with considerations of political legitimacy.”
79 
A representative from the Member States brought forward the argument that it 
was important to listen to the large international ENGOs in the case of the Climate 
Package,  as  they  could  be  instrumental  in  framing  the  public  debate  about  the 
international  post-Kyoto  negotiations  and  in  pressuring  other  countries  to  take  on 
similar commitments (the second step in the EU‟s aims in its fight against climate 
change).
80 This may have contributed to giving the international ENGOs more „ear 
time‟ than the European or national based ones.  
Multi-stakeholder groups tend to be influential since they are often considered 
as more credible than single interest groups, and for that reason  they considerably 
facilitate decision-making. The decision-makers do not need to weigh the different 
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interests against each other when public and private interests have already managed to 
come to an agreement. As expressed by a representative of a small ENGO:  
“As  an  NGO,  it  is  not  whether  you  have  five  or  five 
million members that matter the most, of course it does matter in 
your ability to appeal to the media, etc., but that‟s not what matters 
most. What matters most is your ability to find solutions and create 
alliances that work for people, both as voters, as workers, citizens, 
as consumers, that‟s how  we think. But of course if  you have 5 
million members, you may not have to think like that.”
81 
 
One  interesting  observation  in  the  case  of  the  ETS-directive  that  may  be 
relevant  for  other  cases  is  that  the  various  interest  groups  seemed  to  focus  their 
attention on the actors that were already „on their side.‟ As expressed by one of the 
interviewees, “On the ETS there were very few lobbyists that seemed to cross the 
divide.”
82 The interest groups representing industry focused much of their attention on 
their traditional allies, such as the conservatives in the European People‟s Party, the 
trade unions focused their attention on the Socialists in the PES, and the ENGOs paid 
much attention to the Green MEPs, even though they spoke to the others, too. One 
could have expected the lobbyists to put more effort into trying to convince the „other 
side.‟  The  same  interviewee  argued  that  a  more  proactive  and  successful  lobbyist 
should speak to everybody and should adapt their arguments and points to what the 
receiver is interested in: “It is about adapting your argument and working with the 
different stakeholders that are more credible with their particular audience.”
83 Instead, 
the interest groups focused on trying to strengthen their allies by giving them various 
types of support. The fact that they largely stayed on the side of their „likeminded‟ 
interlocutors could indicate that the positions of the different actors were rather fixed, 
and that they did not judge it worthwhile to try to convince „the others‟.  
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6. Conclusion: General findings 
The final ETS-directive was broadly in line with the Commission‟s proposal - no 
radical changes were made. The fact that the centralised cap on emissions was 
kept was of great importance to the environmental integrity of the directive and 
hence to the ENGOs. The three large ENGOs
84 aimed high but only got one of 
their proposals through in the final directive, while the „small‟ ENGOs, as part 
of a multi-stakeholder
85 group, managed to get a new  article included that was 
not initially proposed by the Commission. Political influence can be assessed in 
counterfactual terms by asking if the result is more in line with the goal of the 
advocacy actor involved than would have been the case had it not in tervened.
86 
Following the results of this study, this question must be answered in the 
affirmative:  the  three  „large‟  ENGOs  managed  to  get  one  of  their  proposals 
through in the final text, and the multi-stakeholder group also got one. Therefore 
the result must be more in line with the goal of the advocacy actors involved 
than had been the case had they not intervened.  
However it has also been argued in the case of the „large‟ ENGOs 
that they had influence when they found allies in the institutions. Therefore, in 
that case it is more pertinent to talk about the ENGOs providing support for 
institutional actors than to talk about influence in the sense of making somebody 
do something that she or he would otherwise not have done. It can be argued that 
the role of the ENGOs is more central when looking at the long-run. Rather than 
exercising direct impact on the legal text, their most important role is in framing 
the public opinion and raising awareness on climate change.  
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The ENGOs used both outsider and insider strategies in their lobbying. 
They organised campaigns, made films, wrote press releases but they also had 
frequent  meetings  with  officials  in  the  Commission,  with  MEPs  and  with 
representatives from the Member States. 
As regards to enabling and constraining factors, several aspects worked 
in  favour  of  an  ambitious  Climate Package:  the  Stern  report  from  2006,  the 
IPCC  report  from  2007,  the  commitment  made  by  the  heads  of  state  and 
government  in  March  2007,  the  election  of  a  new  more  „climate-friendly‟ 
president in the US and the upcoming post-Kyoto summit in December 2009, 
etc. In addition to these factors, the fact that the ETS-directive was to be taken 
by the co-decision procedure increased the chances for the ENGOs to have a say 
through the EP. The financial crisis clearly worked against the ENGOs chances 
to get their arguments listened to, and some of them complained that the climate 
issue soon became forgotten when all media attention was given to the financial 
crisis. 
The  necessity  of  a  speedy  process  made  a  move  of  the  issue  to  the 
European  Council  more  or  less  necessary  in  order  to  achieve  an  agreement 
before the end of the French Presidency, following the threats of certain Member 
States to form a blocking minority. This resulted in a somewhat marginalised 
role of the EP and the Council of Ministers who normally would have shared the 
decision-making power between them. However, this should not be overstated as 
the agreement in the European Council was made within the framework of the 
efforts  made  by  the  EP  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  beforehand.  Since  the 
ENGOs generally do not have any access to the heads of state and government, 
their role became heavily reduced by this decision. On the other hand, it should 
be remembered that most of the influence from these organisations does not   24 
happened during the decision-making phase but well before. Also, the fact that 
the final agreements on several issues were made in the European Council made 
an  early  agreement  possible  and  probably  worked  in  the  interest  of  the 
environmentalists, since this reduced the chances for business interests to exploit 
the emerging financial crisis as a reason to refrain from putting extra costs on 
industry. 
The results show that „small‟ ENGOs sometimes have disproportionate 
power. Under some circumstances, it is easier for ENGOs with few members to 
lobby for a controversial policy than it is for „larger‟ ones. This does not imply 
that  representativeness  does  not  have  any  significance.  Rather,  it  should  be 
understood as an indication that small and the large ENGOs are playing different 
roles. The large ones are superior in producing input legitimacy for an issue. But 
when it comes to finding good solutions to problems, the large ENGOs could be 
less effective if the solution at stake is controversial among environmentalists. 
Many members can work both as an asset and a constraint. 
Divided views exist on whether interest groups have got any real chance of 
influence  in  the  EU  policy  process.  Greenwood  argues  “only  when  the  wider 
discourse is a favourable one are they able to make a direct contribution, and 
otherwise it is a long-term game of planting and cultivating seed corns of ideas.”
87 
In line with this, according to Zito,  
In the EU negotiation process, ENGO position and support 
may change the opinion of institutional actors, but this is less likely; 
the  more  likely  scenario  is  that  they  provide  support  and 
ammunition for the coalition of actors that shares a similar position. 
Thus, other actors adopt the ENGO position to assist their campaign 
and  perhaps  use  the  ENGO  position  to  mask  their  own  position 
from attack.
88 
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Peterson and Bomberg argue that the composition of EU environmental 
policy networks are loose and ad hoc, and that their “policy impact is seldom 
decisive.”
89 All this is in line with what has been found in this study in the case of 
the „large‟ ENGOs: their lobbying was successful in the EP report, but it was 
rather due to the fact that the MEPs were agreeing with them from the beginning 
than that they changed the opinion of the MEPs. In that case, we cannot talk about 
political influence following the definition “modification of one actor‟s behaviour 
by that of another”
90 but rather of auto-causation with support from ENGOs. 
Several explaining factors on how we ended up with this deal in the case 
of the ETS-directive have been evoked throughout this study, inter alia the need 
for a speedy decision due to the EP elections in June 2009 and ultimately the 
need for the EU to have a clear policy in the run-up to the post-Kyoto summit. A 
combination  of  factors  contributed  to  this  particular  outcome,  not  least  the 
dedicated work of ENGOs that has been the focus of this paper. However, one of 
the  most  decisive  factors  might  have  been  the  commitment  made  in  the 
European Council conclusions of March 2007, as it forced heads of state and 
government to reach an agreement, despite being faced by what was possibly 
one  of  the  most  severe  financial  crises  ever  seen.  To  use  an  expression  by 
Schimmelfennig,  the  Member  States  were  „rhetorically  entrapped‟
91  by  the 
commitments made in 2007 and this, in an indirect way, forced them to deliver.  
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